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In accordance with Richard Dawkins‟ materialist “selfish gene” theory of human 
behavior, altruism is a subject matter that is treated conservatively by biologists, whose 
understanding of the human version of altruism tends toward mutualistic and sometimes 
reputation-based explanations of charity, kindness, and helping. Trivers (1971) first stated that 
non-kin altruism could evolve if altruistic behavior is balanced between partners over time, 
implicating a strictly mutualistic domain for kindness. But kindness herein is defined, beyond 
mere mutualism or reciprocity, as “the quality of being friendly, generous, and considerate.” 
Further, kindness tends to have an action-oriented dimension, as in Goetz et al.‟s (2010) 
definition of compassion, denoting helpfulness, the reduction of another‟s suffering, or self- 
sacrifice. 
In this paper, I will employ a biocultural approach in exploring the psychological and 
neuroscientific data on the evolutionary aspect of social behavior as it pertains to kindness. First, 
I will draw on evolutionary theories of cooperation in suggesting that an individual and 
ideological ethos of kindness could have evolved as an adaptive orientation that, in a 
Durkheimian sense, preempted ostracism and cemented alliances as a beneficial balance to the 
fitness risks inherent in altruism. Then, consulting data on the neurochemical profiles of 
dopamine and oxytocin, I will describe the sort of human psychological variation that would 
reveal a complimentary continuum of evolved social proclivities, from selfish to giving. In 
proposing that non-reciprocal kindness indeed exists, however, I argue that its presence in human 
societies is statistically rare, as assumptions about human biology suggest. This study thus 
concludes with a cautious message about the human condition: while the rareness of kindness 
should have a profoundly fundamental explanatory value in social analysis, scientific 
confirmation of its fragility would recommend further scholarship designed to highlight its 
exceptional biological position vis-à-vis the selfish gene. 
Dedication 
 
To Alena, Grace, and Magnolia: for all the wonderful berry moments. 
Table of Contents 
Introduction… ...................................................................................................................... 1 
An Introductory Note Regarding a Biocultural Framework… ............................................. 5 
Mirror Neurons and Preconscious Affectivity .................................................................... 11 
Neurotransmitters, Canines, and Cooperation… ................................................................ 15 
The Biology of Social Sensitivity ....................................................................................... 24 
Ethnocentrism and Conformity as Realities of Altruism .................................................... 32 
Beyond Altruism and Homo Economicus: Kindness as Fitness ......................................... 40 
Conclusion… ....................................................................................................................... 53 




A Zen parable goes: “A man traveling across a field encountered a tiger. He fled, the tiger 
after him. Coming to a precipice, he caught hold of the root of a wild vine and swung himself 
down over the edge. The tiger sniffed at him from above. Trembling, the man looked down to 
where, far below, another tiger was waiting to eat him. Only the vine sustained him. Two mice, 
one white and one black, little by little started to gnaw away the vine. The man saw a luscious 
strawberry near him. Grasping the vine with one hand, he plucked the strawberry with the other. 
How sweet it tasted!” 
As my 14-year-old niece goes through the growing pains of adolescence, I watch her 
slowly learning how the world works--the first boyfriend breakup, the sudden betrayal of a 
friend, the shuffling back and forth between the homes of divorced parents on their second 
marriages--and wish there were some way I could go through it all for her. I was already wishing 
that in 2003 when she was born, foreseeing, as she slept in my arms, the ups and downs to come. 
And now I wish she could live in a country that had not just elected a man who made fun of a 
handicapped person from the campaign stage and was caught on video joking about how fame is 
a license for assaulting women. Then I think of the classic dad response: life isn‟t fair; the fair is 
a place for prize hogs and horses. Sometimes, the prospects for humanity look pretty bleak. But 
there are strawberries out there for my niece to find, aren‟t there? 
In The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012), 
social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2012) claims that the sensibility informing liberal 
sociopolitics in the West, for example, is based on an affective moral orientation toward care, in 
the form of welfare, and fairness, in the form of diversity and tolerance. For that matter, 
Christianity is supposed to be based on an ethos of self-sacrifice. This doesn‟t prove that a given 
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Democrat wouldn‟t kick his dog or that all Christians tip their waiters generously. But it does 
indicate that such values at least exist as aspirations. There are, no doubt, Republicans who 
would give you the shirt off their back but would still prefer that abortion were illegal. Or would 
they only give you their shirt if they knew you, if you were from their hometown and went to 
their church and, perhaps, had their skin color? For many decades now, biologists have 
suggested that this provincial kind of ethos, rather than one based on care and fairness, is natural 
based on the evolutionary limits of altruism. Combined with the daily news of the corrosive 
effects of power and money in the neoliberal era, and the microaggressions and indignities we all 
experience at work and at school from time to time, the future does seem grim. But new data in 
the field of neuroscience suggests material evidence for strawberries on the cliff of the human 
condition. In particular, this research reveals the evolutionary roots of non-reciprocal acts of 
kindness, from paying for the next person‟s bill at the drive-thru window to donating to 
international hurricane relief funds. 
Neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni‟s (2009) Mirroring People: The Science of Empathy and 
How We Connect with Others suggests that humans‟ ability to quickly read facial expressions 
(indeed, in microseconds, without consciously doing so) indicates the biological root of empathy 
and possibly morality. Mirror neurons are one of several types of cells in the central nervous 
system that electrically transmit information through synapses upon environmental stimulation. 
Speaking anthropologically, the author labels mirror neurons as the biological basis of 
intersubjectivity, the intangible interactions and connections between “self” and “other” (152), a 
very basic aspect of the human condition which continues to baffle and enthrall social theorists 
in all its inexplicable complexity and nuance. The firing of mirror neurons in the brain is, in fact, 
“pre-reflective” (265), and is thus the neurological basis for humanity‟s complex social behavior 
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because it “helps us to recognize and understand [others‟] motives and intentions” (6), an 
integral function in a species for which behavioral plasticity and group cooperation have resulted 
in unprecedented ecological expansion. One of the problems that plagues the human condition, 
though, is that humanity‟s so-called success, particularly in the form of social cooperation, does 
not necessarily always equate to cooperative benevolence. And so the question that this paper 
will address is: is there a biology of kindness? 
The materialist view of human behavior, most famously delineated by Richard Dawkins 
in his “selfish gene” theory, tends to advocate a fairly primitive state of affairs in which we are 
“born selfish” ([1976] 1989, 3) and “most of what we strive for in our modern life uses the 
apparatus of goal seeking that was originally set up to seek goals in the state of nature” (qtd in 
Miele 1995). In accordance with this evolutionary paradigm, altruism is a subject matter that is 
treated conservatively by biologists, whose understanding of the human version of altruism tends 
toward mutualistic and sometimes reputation-based explanations of charity in modern humans. 
Trivers (1971) first stated that non-kin altruism could evolve if altruistic behavior is balanced 
between partners over time, implicating a strictly mutualistic domain for kindness. But kindness 
herein is defined, beyond mere mutualism or reciprocity, as “the quality of being friendly, 
generous, and considerate.” Further, kindness tends to have an action-oriented dimension, as in 
Goetz et al.‟s (2010) definition of compassion, denoting helpfulness (2), the reduction of 
another‟s suffering (2, 23), or self-sacrifice (23). 
Classic anthropological studies have tended to confirm the mutualistic, i.e. non-generous, 
parameters of altruism in the repeated documentation of institutions revolving around the tedious 
yet critical obligations of reciprocal exchange, thus justifying a biologically conservative view of 
generosity. Even the well-known potlatch ceremony of the indigenous peoples of the Pacific 
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Northwest, in which a powerful man puts on an expensive community feast and gives away his 
belongings, was found to be a form of competition in which the gifts presented represented a 
man‟s “portfolio” for assertion of chieftainship (Wolf 1982, 186-194). Research in social 
psychology also shows that charity and social magnanimity are often reserved either for kin, for 
our local community, or for those within a shared cultural or ethnic boundary--those with whom 
we have a perceived or real connection. In this paper, I will explore the psychological and 
neuroscientific data on the evolutionary aspects of interpersonal behavior as it pertains to 
kindness, which is herein treated as an emotionally motivated and behaviorally manifested 
outcome of empathy. While the temporal trajectory of the paper will extend from discussions of 
our ancestors to modern humans, a thematic shift will trend from the biological to the social 
psychology of culture. 
In this paper, I will employ a biocultural approach in exploring the psychological and 
neuroscientific data on the evolutionary aspect of social behavior as it pertains to kindness. First, 
I will draw on evolutionary theories of cooperation in suggesting that an individual and 
ideological ethos of kindness could have evolved as an adaptive orientation that, in a 
Durkheimian sense, preempted ostracism and cemented alliances as a beneficial balance to the 
fitness risks inherent in altruism. Then, consulting data on the neurochemical profiles of 
dopamine and oxytocin, I will describe the sort of human psychological variation that would 
reveal a complimentary continuum of evolved social proclivities, from selfish to giving. I will 
argue that social proximity in small groups, as the natural state of human evolution, is a strong 
factor in the manifestation of kindness but not its limit as evidenced by philanthropy and 
ideologies promoting universal equality. But, as such beliefs systems seem to flounder in the 
public sphere in the face of coercive policies that sustain traditional inequalities, this study 
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concludes with an equivocal message about the human condition: while the rareness of kindness 
should have a profoundly fundamental explanatory value in social analysis, scientific 
confirmation of its fragility would recommend further scholarship designed to highlight its 
exceptional biological position vis-à-vis the selfish gene. I begin by articulating the rationale of a 
biocultural approach. 
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE REGARDING A BIOCULTURAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Based on the helter-skelter state of the art today in cultural anthropology, which is on a 
trajectory to fully dismiss the theory of structure, and along with it, the realities of hegemony (in 
contrast with sociology, which generally assumes its framework as a critique of it), I would 
suggest that structuralist theories of old are in need of revival if the field‟s practitioners are 
interested in the cultivation of any moral or intellectual authority in the twenty-first century‟s 
embattled public sphere. As it now stands, the scope of post-structuralist deconstructionism and 
ontology have seemed to suggest to scholars emerging from the academy that the study of 
humanity be the study of 7 billion realities, requiring 7 billion biographies. Totalities in the form 
of cross-cultural work are not possible in the fragmentary and disjointed space of the 
contemporary humanities paradigm, and although neoliberalism comes closest to having a 
holistic signature, to chronicle it only as the sum of atomized ordeals, and to frame suffering as a 
phenomenon most indicative of historical particularism, is to mistake human history for a series 
of coincidences and to abandon the study of ánthrōpos as a species exhibiting problematic 
patterns involving behavioral predispositions with millennia of documentation. These 
predispositions can either be addressed through awareness-raising, or we can continue to ignore 
them while puzzling over the shattered mirror‟s reflection. 
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Franz Boas, with historical particularism, froze American anthropology in its nascent 
form. His disdain for the pseudoscience used in racist arguments at the time, while astonishingly 
courageous and scientifically correct, led him to guide his venerable students and then most 
future American anthropologists to focus on culture difference instead of culture similarity. He 
correctly asserted that culture difference is not linked to phenotypical difference, but he 
problematically lost sight of the fact that the human species' biological similarities, honed 
through evolution, are the drive behind human culture itself. 
Cultures, I believe, need to be seen as symbolic manifestations of a material psychology 
grounded in a system of neurochemical prompts for social behavior. Such an approach can be 
described as a neo-functionalism that amends Malinowski‟s oversight that maladaptive behavior 
can also fall under the rubric of “functional” if it serves the ever-capricious pull of the social. 
This is not a premise one gleans from an ethnography on the Hadza nor in a chapter on femoral 
medial condyle morphology. But it represents a badly needed anthropological synthesis 
coherently addressing while rehabilitating the concept of human nature. 
The source for human behaviors lies in somewhere around 7 million years of shared 
evolution; this is an uncontroversial statement outside of the humanities. Culture does not 
disprove the assertion; culture provides evidence that natural selection for social behavior shaped 
hominin biology. What this means for anthropologists is that the behaviors of humankind are not 
accidental in the Boasian sense, even as human experiences are myriad. As shown in works such 
as Haidt‟s moral foundations theory or Noam Chomsky‟s universal grammar, our interactions 
and drives are theoretically understandable through the pursuit of evolutionary and psychological 
research. Of course, this kind of statement rings the bell built by Edward Said that signals the 
collusion of empiricism with imperialism. But empiricism is also on the side of global warming 
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data, stem-cell research, evolution in school curricula, and the eyeglasses or contacts that you‟re 
wearing right now to read this print. Furthermore, as cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker argues 
in The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (2002), it might be understood, were it 
not for its paradigmatic status, that social constructionism, via the false narrative of Locke‟s 
blank slate, is as much an Enlightenment legacy as is positivism. 
In advancing toward a biocultural approach, structuralist theory, however, only takes us 
halfway. That is, it supplies the cultural half, but it starts at the wrong end. As a result, 
structuralist insights from the likes of Durkheim and Weber to Geertz and Turner are limited to 
their own abilities to observe and muse perspicaciously. For instance, are we to accept that force 
of habit represents the main reason for the reproduction of a culture‟s status quo? Should we not 
wonder why the social structure seems to have the gravitational pull to normalize and naturalize 
everyday perception, supernatural superstitions, and state violence? Why should habitus be taken 
for granted by an anthropologist as having such explanatory power? Why does an emotional 
ontology so consistently develop cross-culturally from the recursivity of experience and 
convention? I must pursue a project that marries the biological and the cultural because I feel that 
there is no need for studies of culture to limit themselves to philosophical abstractions. 
Thus, I hereby reject what evolutionary psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1992) label 
“the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM): the consensus view of the nature of social and 
cultural phenomena that has served for a century” to justify “claims of autonomy from the rest of 
science” and has resulted in “an enormous mass of half-digested observations, a not 
inconsiderable body of empirical generalizations, and a contradictory stew of ungrounded, 
middle-level theories expressed in a babel of incommensurate technical lexicons” (23). The 
authors wish to “jettison” the SSSM, bemoaning it as being rooted in the “ancient dualism 
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endemic to the Western cultural tradition” that the human individual can be divided into 
biological and nonbiological aspects (1992, 21). It cannot. Nearly two hundred years ago, Marx 
himself expressed a similar concern, saying, “The individual is the social being. His life...is 
therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man‟s individual and species life are not 
different… One basis for life and another basis for science is a priori a lie. The nature which 
comes to be in human history--the genesis of human society--is man‟s real nature… Natural 
science will in time subsume under itself the science of man” (1978, 86; 90-91). As academics 
interested in the health of the public sphere, we must be vigilant of the importance of knowing 
and acknowledging our own limits as well as those of our species, which is as strictly composed 
of atoms as is anything else. 
As Kurt Andersen points out in his Atlantic article “How America Lost Its Mind” (2017), 
President George W. Bush‟s Senior Advisor Karl Rove is attributed with having said, “the 
reality-based community believes that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible 
reality...That's not the way the world really works anymore...when we act, we create our own 
reality.” The liberal and conservative sides of this coin both read tails, however. For instance, in 
academia since the 1960‟s, Andersen explains, statements like this one from French sociologist 
Jean Baudrillard have been formulated: “the secret of theory is that truth does not exist.” Based 
on a general rejection of arrogant institutional assertions about white male superiority over other 
races and the female sex that led to atrocities like the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment and the 
Holocaust, scholars like Foucault and Said have rejected not only the Enlightenment program of 
human progress but scientific discourse in general, and with it, the possibilities of empiricism. 
Pinker (2018) has recently abridged this movement: 
 
Intellectuals hate progress. Intellectuals who call themselves “progressive”  really 
hate progress. It‟s not that they hate the fruits of progress, mind you… It‟s the 
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idea of progress that rankles the chattering class--the Enlightenment belief that by 
understanding the world we can improve the human condition... If you think 
knowledge can solve problems, then you have a “blind faith” and a “quasi- 
religious belief” in the “outmoded superstition” of the “false promise” of the 
“myth” of the “onward march” of “inevitable progress.” ...You are a practitioner 
of “Whig history,” a “naive optimist,” a “Pollyanna,” and of course a 
“Pangloss”...who asserts “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.” (39) 
 
Anthropologist Bruno Latour is a more recent example of the anti-science intellectual. In The 
Pasteurization of France (1988), he argues that the social construction of scientific knowledge 
surrounding the discovery of the microbe was strategically allied with the forces of the state and 
the military to intervene coercively, as in Foucault‟s concept of biopower and the panopticon, in 
the lives of European citizens. Under the influence of the zealous postmodernist urge to rebel 
against reason and science, Latour has contributed to the construction of the new authority of 
doubt in expressing scorn over the theory that Pharaoh Ramses II died of tuberculosis because 
the bacillus was not discovered until 1882, stating that it did not exist until it was “invented,” or 
culturally constructed (2000, 248). (One wonders, then, about heliocentrism?) Speaking of 
agency--which Latour does--imagine for a moment the unmitigated privilege it takes to argue 
against material facts simply for the sake of polemic. 
So, I would suggest that, as long as scholars in the humanities continue to demure over 
reality while extending the reality of our careers and our families, we forfeit our moral authority 
in the political sphere--where unreality has, lately, brought the Orwellian dystopia frighteningly 
to life. While I acknowledge that “authority” is the ultimate problem being addressed in the post- 
1968 milieu, I assert that if there can be many ontologies and many subjectivities, there can 
also be many authorities--some of them scientific and simultaneously anti-power. 
This paper, therefore, addresses the material deficit in anthropology‟s cultural theory 
while bracketing the field‟s postmodern crisis of conscience, first articulated by James Clifford 
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in 1983. In connecting current data about human evolution to documented social behavioral 
patterns, I forego the intellectual angst of deconstructionism, deferral, irreduction, relativism, and 
reflexivity while reclaiming the potential for a liberal academic authority in an attempt to 
separate anthropology from the same social paranoia that, on the right, pushes epistemic murk 
like a drug dealer, feeding people who crave the kind of plausible deniability that enables public 
indecencies represented, as Andersen says, by President Trump‟s birtherism, Steve Bannon‟s 
liberal illuminati theory, or climate change denial. I suggest that there are, indeed, ways to know 
things, and that these include positivist avenues that are epistemologically trustworthy (if subject 
to refutation through the scientific method). 
Attempting to move beyond the sort of Cartesian dogma that has resulted in the denial of 
human nature through social constructionism on the Left and, on the Right, post-truth fake news 
and the subjectivity of one‟s net worth according to mood (Khalid 2011; Carter 2018), I contend 
that twenty-first-century anthropologists should not be bullied by the postmodernist vogue into 
ignoring the repeating patterns of the human condition. Denial of these patterns through the 
fetishization, as Foucault (1988) says, of such abstract vehicles as language and symbol is no 
longer feasible. Nor, however, do I wish to continue his supposedly avant garde tradition of 
fetishizing all modern coercive power as a function of scientific rationalism. Therefore, I am not 
concerned here with the political abuses of positivism--the abusers must hold that water, for 1) 
the philosophy itself is neutral, 2) it can be used just as easily for progress, and 3) state abuses 
are not synonymous with positivism but with any tool they can manipulate for malice. Are we to 
blame the political violence of the Roman or the Mongolian empire on horse husbandry and 
metallurgy? Or on an ugly facet of human nature? 
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A defense of the post-postmodernist possibilities inherent in a biocultural approach thus 
articulated, it is my aim now to explore whether anthropological discourse about science as an 
insidious specter can be turned on its head in mobilizing it as a tool of anti-power by tracing the 
material contours of the possibilities of kindness and asking answerable questions about its 
seeming lack of impact on human history. 
MIRROR NEURONS AND PRECONSCIOUS AFFECTIVITY 
 
Along with the autonomic nervous system, the amygdala, and the anterior cingulate 
cortex, the human face‟s muscles are considered to be the initial areas of physiological arousal in 
emotional experiences, as they code information within milliseconds along a rather primitive 
dichotomous valence of whether stimuli are good or bad for the individual (Buijs and Swaab 
2013; Reihl et al. 2015; Pohl et al. 2013). A small area of the brain in the inferior temporal cortex 
called the fusiform face area (FFA) is a specialized part of the human vision system tailored to 
the automatic recognition of other faces (and it is this part of the brain that causes one to detect 
facial features such as eyes, a nose, and a mouth even in things that are not faces, such as floral 
designs or wood ring patterns). Cognitive neuroscientists believe that this specialty evolved as a 
survival mechanism in our ancestors and later became a baseline trait for the type of 
preconscious social responsiveness that further propelled the species‟ demographic success 
(Kanwisher and Yovel 2006, 2109). 
Mirror neurons constitute the basis of the social self; unlike other neurons, which tend to 
deal with the senses, motor functions, thought, and memory, these neurons are as “„interested in‟ 
other people as they are in the self in whose brain they reside” (Iacoboni 2009, 132). They fire 
immediately at the sight of another person‟s behavior, signaling the motor areas of the brain as if 
communicating that the same action should be imitated. Simultaneously, other types of 
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specialized neurons remind the brain that it is only a simulation so that the actions are not 
physically carried out. Mirror neurons were accidentally discovered in laboratory macaques, an 
Old World monkey exhibiting behaviors involving intricate social hierarchies. In a study on the 
connection between the premotor cortex and the manipulation of mundane objects with the hand, 
neuroscientists noticed that certain neurons were firing when a monkey was resting, and they 
soon realized that the subject was observing and mentally imitating the grasping behavior of a 
nearby human. 
Iacoboni later found that, in humans, areas of mirror neuron activity are connected to and 
stimulate “emotional brain areas in the limbic system, particularly the amygdala--a limbic 
structure highly responsive to faces” (2009, 118-119). Through fMRI scans (functional 
resonance magnetic imaging), De Vignemont and Singer (2006) had earlier shown “overlapping 
brain activation patterns when subjects feel their own emotions and observe the same emotions 
in others” (435). Upon observation of another person‟s emotional state--say, someone who has 
hit himself on the thumb with a hammer--mirror neurons activate for the corresponding facial 
expressions and then awaken the emotional centers in the brain that would be active in the 
suffering person (122). This means that the nonpathological brain is capable of “producing a full 
simulation, even the motor component, of observed painful experiences,” suggesting that mirror 
neurons are the biological mechanism upon which social ties are built and maintained (124). For 
Iacoboni, mirror neurons confirm the phenomenology of Husserl and Wittgenstein to the 
exclusion of Cartesian dualism in light of “the immediacy of our perception of the mental states 
of other people” (262). Thus, he concludes, “we are biologically wired...to be deeply 
interconnected with one another” (267). 
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I think it is difficult to overstate the implications of mirror neurons in social theory, were 
it common in today‟s academy to pursue such a broad interdisciplinary sensibility. For the time 
being, however, the discovery of mirror neurons adds credence to the view of psychologists and 
psychiatrists that there is a prominent biological aspect to human social behavior, so often 
thought of in strictly cultural terms in many anthropological circles. What cultural 
anthropologists tend to forget, in their submersion in the humanities, is that people‟s initial and 
essentially involuntary responses to environmental stimuli are informed not only by culture but 
by adjustments made through millions of years of evolution that have dictated what automatic 
responses serve the individual best. Scholars of hard science, on the other hand, will often deny 
the pull of the social, as they tend to think of the individual and the corporeal body as nothing 
more or less than the “survival machine” (Dawkins 1989, 19) for selfish genes, although some 
seem to understand the situation, bound up in self-awareness and maladaptive behavior as it is, 
as a combination of nature and nurture (e.g. Niehoff 1999; Ehrlich 2002). Thus, the discovery of 
mirror neurons as the physiological basis for intersubjectivity is as confounding to biological 
conceptions of human behavior as it is unfamiliar to humanities-based understandings of culture. 
Psychologists today try to strike a happy medium in the nature vs. nurture debate, 
allowing that conditioning through experience, including culturally-informed experiences 
(enculturation), does play a part in our thoughts and feelings and actions. Yet, it is possible that 
most cultural variation can be subsumed under a genetic predisposition to group bonding and 
idiosyncratic “badging,” the more complex behavioral-cultural correlate of instinctual kin- 
recognition that some biologists propose evolved to facilitate instantaneous extra-kin 
identification (Irwin 1986, 138; Qirko 2013, 135, 147). An example of the material parameters 
that influence us preconsciously but within cultural parameters is appraisal theory, which states 
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that “emotions and appraisals of events are likely to be culturally variable, but the relationship 
between appraisals and emotions is culturally general, perhaps even universal… Goals, values, 
and tastes can vary enormously across cultures, creating manifest and important differences in 
the content of emotional experience. According to appraisal theories the process remains the 
same: the appraisal of goal conduciveness has the same emotional consequence across cultures, 
regardless of the cultural differences in the definition of what‟s worth striving for” (Davidson et 
al. 2003, 584). This is a highly succinct summary of the biocultural paradigm that illustrates the 
ancient rootedness of emotions in specifically social “behavioral patterns that evolved to adapt to 
stimuli critical for survival and species preservation” (Depue and Collins 1999, 497). 
According to Zajonc‟s (1980) dual process theory, the first step in the sensation of an 
emotional event happens preconsciously, signals whether something is good or bad, and takes 
place in the evolutionarily older limbic system of the brain. Studies on the physiology of 
emotions reveal that split-second autonomic biological responses tend to guide the higher 
mechanisms of information processing (Haidt 2012, 55), the phenomenon referenced above in 
“goal conduciveness” and earlier in Dawkins‟s “apparatus of goal seeking.” In fact, a shockingly 
large majority of our mental processes “occur outside our awareness but actually govern most of 
our behavior” (xxi)--a difficult pill to swallow for those of us invested in our free will and our 
exceptional intelligence. Summarizing the neuroscientific consensus, Reihl et al. (2015) state 
that, as in badging behavior, 
A fundamental aspect of social interaction and social cognition is the rapid 
identification of others as either similar to (in-group) or different from (out-group) 
the self. This type of social/affective decision making utilizes heuristics to 
automatically categorize individuals based on easily observable traits, factors, or 
characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, gender, age, weight, speech, attire, profession, 
hobbies, grooming). (249) 
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The authors‟ description of social cognition is illustrative of a biocultural phenomenon. 
 
Thus, social facts like stereotypes, prejudices, and displays of group identity are culturally 
specific but have an instinctual genesis. In fact, the ability to learn and incorporate appropriate 
cultural responses into one‟s behavioral repertoire is part of an evolutionary format that bent 
humanity toward its current demographic success. As Haidt suggests, while cultures seem to 
vary with a stunning diversity on the surface, many cultural constructions are likely built on a 
small set of behavioral foundations that was developed in our ancestors (2012, 145). This is 
because, while there is wiggle room for variance in cultural traits across the globe, behavior per 
se tends to manifest in repeating patterns because it is constrained by what the evolved 
physiology will allow, and this includes the adaptive force that, on average, binds people to each 
other and the cultures they inhabit. 
NEUROTRANSMITTERS, CANINES, AND COOPERATION 
 
The theory of the selfish gene states that individuals in a given species will always act in 
a manner motivated by their own self-interest, which is a behavioral manifestation of the genetic 
blueprint for the genes‟ own self-replication. Interestingly, the older concept of “Homo 
economicus” defines rational human action similarly: as a product of an individual‟s self- 
interest. The premise was first expressed by pre-Marxian political economists like Adam Smith 
and, later, John Stuart Mill, who, not unlike Hobbes in his conception of natural law, believed 
that people prefer to accumulate the most assets through the least labor possible. Mill wrote: 
[Political economy] is concerned with [man] solely as a being who desires to 
possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of 
means for obtaining that end… It makes entire abstraction of every other human 
passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually 
antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and 
desire   of  the   present  enjoyment   of   costly  indulgences.   ([1844]   2000,  97) 
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Of the pull of wealth, Hobbes wrote, centuries earlier, that, out of the relative equal physical 
abilities of humans existing in a so-called (pre-state) state of nature 
ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men 
desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become 
enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne 
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or 
subdue one another. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath 
no more to feare, than another mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or 
possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared 
with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his 
labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger  
of another. (Chapter XIII) 
 
Thus, as it relates to altruism, and in accordance with the selfish gene, the biological version of 
Homo economicus will act only in furtherance of his or her genes, which means that generosity 
and kindness are too costly in the same way that failing to provide for one‟s defense against 
other‟s desires leads to dispossession, danger, or even death in the Hobbesian war of all against 
all. 
Studies in social psychology tend to confirm the selfish-gene theory that human emotions 
underlie a subconsciously instrumental view of the world that corresponds with the designs of a 
survival machine. Orientation toward survival is a situation microscopically reflected by what 
Iacoboni calls canonical neurons, which fire not only at the sight of an action, as mirror neurons 
do, but even at the sight of an actionable object, indicating a preconscious faculty of readiness 
beyond the basic reactivity of fight-or-flight. Here is a motor-specific property of human 
behavior, but the utility of known others and objects in the environment is also assigned by the 
central nervous system‟s program of neurochemical rewards and punishments that encourage or 
discourage behaviors and thoughts. Like canonical neurons only socially geared, this mechanism 
demonstrates a survival machine‟s--a person‟s--readiness to react to or interact with any and all 
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nearby counterparts based on what the brain‟s goal-seeking apparatus deems as bearing positive 
or negative emotional connotations for the individual. 
Echoing a Dawkinsian framework, Iacoboni states that “in evolutionary terms, the 
[neurochemical] reward system has probably evolved from a system that evaluated primary goals 
such as food and sex” to one that is much more socially focused (2009, 223). Ultimately, the 
evolution of cooperation (in any species) is never more than a balance for individuals between 
subsistence, reproduction, and mortality--the same balance maintained in solitary species. As 
Alexander (1974) pointed out long ago, group-living in animals can only have evolved “because 
all of the individuals involved [in the group] somehow gain genetically” (327). Since social 
animals have the same selfish genes that all other biota possess (actually, some amoeba species 
have a much larger genome than humans have!), individual members of social species must also 
have genes that code for ways in which behaving socially helps them live to reproduce. 
Evolutionary psychologists believe that, “over evolutionary time, social animals who 
formed strong relationships and were integrated most strongly into group living were most likely 
to survive, reproduce, and raise offspring to reproductive age” (MacDonald and Leary 2005, 
203), so that selection for intensively social behavior informed the human species‟ behavioral 
reward system. Physiological rewards that prompt proactive social behavior and provoke 
happiness, good moods, or other automatic responses (such as sexual attraction or mother-infant 
bonding) include the activity of neurotransmitters like dopamine, serotonin, norepinephrine, 
endorphin, vasopressin, and oxytocin. These are the seeds of the strawberries. 
Some of these neurotransmitters, such as dopamine, are naturally-occurring opioids, 
which provide a feel-good emotional boost in the same way that opioid painkillers do, 
reinforcing the future repetition of a pleasant social interaction in the same way that 
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norepinephrine, a product of physical stress, warns us to avoid future aggressive dogs. Similarly, 
a neuropeptide and hormone called oxytocin, made in the hypothalamus, acts as a chemical 
reward for social bonding--new mothers normally produce it during childbirth and breastfeeding 
in order to bind them emotionally to their infants, and it is produced relatively easily in any type 
of interpersonal circumstance, especially through intimate contact with another person, such as 
even a back rub from a total stranger (Haidt 2012, 270). Oxytocin in mammals “has been shown 
to increase in response to the onset of pair-bonding in adults, maternal attachment, infant 
attachment, maternal responsivity, positive social behaviors or contact, onset of sexual behavior, 
and exploration or approach to novelty” (Davidson et al. 2003, 1095). In the next section I will 
elaborate on these neurotransmitters and their function in social cohesion, but first, I will discuss 
a few origin theories for social evolution in our ancient ancestors. 
As biologists, zoologists, and ethologists have looked into evolutionary explanations for 
the common presence of human social institutions like charity, socialism/welfare, gifting, animal 
rights, and environmentalism, they consistently conclude with a contribution to the consensus 
that emphasizes a Homo economicus view involving the psychological or reputational wellbeing 
of the generous individual (e.g. Roberts 2011, Chapters 9 to 11). But it is my premise in this 
section that the selfish gene does not represent a properly complete paleoanthropological 
understanding of the evolution of Homo sapiens. 
While I do not disagree that the evolutionary “problem” of charity, as a drag on 
biological fitness, is resolvable through an analysis of the neurochemical and reputation-based 
(and thus biologically selfish) rewards that counterbalance fitness risks, scientists underestimate 
or outright ignore the degree to which these motivations resolve themselves as some of the more 
positive and satisfying (and unique) aspects of human existence. Without these, in an intelligent 
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species able to capitalize on a constant awareness of its own selfish desires, life might not be 
worth living. Thus, even though it is true that subconscious inclinations drive us toward altruistic 
behaviors that promote the selfish gene, the considerateness and caring involved in acts of 
kindness, empathetic ideologies, and humanitarian organizations represent the provisioning of 
sweet strawberries to others as they hang precariously on the cliff of life and, importantly, do not 
manifest phenomenologically in the living world as selfishness but as goodness. 
Sociobiologist Christopher Boehm (1982) has proposed that the kind of social 
intelligence that, today, enables kindness, began to evolve as an adaptive response to a new 
hominid lifestyle that downplayed dominance/submission conflict as the social status quo.The 
gradual development of reduced conflict among our ancestors is evidenced by a reduction in 
canine size around 7 million years ago in Sahelanthropus tchadensis--at the very beginning of 
the hominin line--and, later, a reduction in sexual dimorphism (Nakahashi and Horiuchi 2012, 
57); the reasons for these changes are unclear, but the trajectory toward modern behavior almost 
certainly involved changing mating and/or feeding strategies, possibly prompted by climato- 
ecological changes (Villmoare 2018, 80-81). 
Based on comparison with other primates‟ mating/territorial systems, and taking reduced 
canines into account, the human reproductive system is most likely to have evolved in multiple- 
male, multiple-female societies, as with chimpanzees, but where male–male competition is 
weak(er) and predation is highly likely--in such conditions, males are less physically powerful 
and, thus, life in groups is a safety strategy (Nakahashi and Horiuchi 2012, 62). As such, the 
ability to socially navigate within cohesive groups would be advantageous, too. Not that we 
should assume that reduced aggression in our ancestors equates to communitarian peace on the 
homefront--intracommunity violence occurs in all our primate cousins, and our closest ones, the 
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chimpanzees, seem to be the nastiest, fighting not only over mates or as a result of anthropogenic 
stressors but, most often, as infanticide or to reduce resource competition (Wilson et al. 2004, 
Wilson et al. 2014). Bonobo behavior, however, illustrates best the sort of early reduction in 
intragroup aggression that may have presented in our ancestors: their ability to amicably forage 
together in large groups (not collectively, but side-by-side) without fighting over spoils is a 
hallmark of their behavior compared to that of chimps (Wrangham 2000). 
Paleoanthropologists are in agreement that something novel occurred with the reduction 
of canines and the canine shearing complex (Kimbel and Delezene 2009, 37). Lacking dangerous 
canines, “any weaponry or physical or behavioral advantage that helps males win contests should 
be powerfully favored by selection” (Plavcan 2012, 52). This novelty therefore probably 
involved the development of coalitionary violence, which is seen in anthropoid taxa with small 
canines (52) but also in our closest genetic relatives, the chimps, as an antipredator and territorial 
defense strategy (55). Such a theory would suggest that coalitional intergroup violence, as has 
been documented in chimpanzees who go to “war” over resources (Ehrlich 2002, 207), long 
preceded the cultural invention of warfare. As zoologist Richard D. Alexander argued, 
intragroup cooperation was a hallmark of early hominins, but intergroup aggressive competition 
was its prime stimulation (Melotti 1986, 95). Hobbes may as well have been articulating a 
theoretical hominin evolution when he wrote, “For as to the strength of body, the weakest has 
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, 
that are in the same danger with himselfe” (Chapter XIII). As canine reduction and cooperation 
faculties ensued, potentially in tandem with pair-bonding or male provisioning of offspring, and 
combined with the type of body-mass increase typical in K-strategy species that eventually 
allowed for encephalization, a perfect storm of incipient altruism began to brew. 
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According to Boehm, the adaptive ability to detect pending intragroup conflict or even 
preempt it through diplomacy (called “conflict interference” among chimps and bonobos) 
became the new status quo as a substitute for the old order maintained by the alpha male and his 
elite court, although a cursory glance at any national history will show both paradigms existing 
side by side at various levels of organization (and one could argue that conflict interference tends 
to manifest most effectively in smaller human groups--a matter to be discussed in the section on 
ethnocentrism as altruism). With regards to the evolution of the human faculty of conflict 
avoidance, Boehm and, more recently, Haidt (2012), Tomasello et al. (2012), and Raghanti et al. 
(2018) propose the concept of shared intentionality as the unparalleled hallmark of human 
cooperation. Boehm asserts that the capacity to inwardly represent others (called “theory of 
mind” and now connected to mirror neurons; Gallese and Goldman 1998) is perhaps present in 
subordinate social primates who can “pick up on very subtle cues because of their greater social 
sensitivity” (1982, 416), and he stresses that this sensitivity was instrumental at the onset of 
reduced intragroup aggression. It essentially picked up the slack left by the alpha as daily group 
interactions became less competitive and less based on body mass and canine size. 
Tomasello et al. argue that recursivity was involved in the groundbreaking act of 
collective foraging, which is difficult for all other great apes to accomplish due to food 
competition (2012, 680). Recursivity and collaboration, they say, required the conceptualization 
of “joint intentionality,” the ability to share in the knowledge of and agree upon a shared goal. 
After this behavior became an ontogenetic norm, a new condition of mutual interdependence 
necessitated that pressures be put in place to punish what behavioral economists call “free- 
riders” or cheaters, further enhancing the species‟ success. Haidt theorizes that moralities 
centered around fairness “evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of reaping the rewards of 
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cooperation without getting exploited” (2012, 178), and he later expanded this concept to 
incorporate the communal punitive aspect of norms and laws. But all types of social animals, 
from reef fish to chimpanzees, engage in the punishment of free-riders (Sasaki and Uchida 
2013), illustrating the commonplace evolution of this solution to the problem of the selfish gene. 
It is possible that an ecological need for memory in wide-ranging foraging plus the socio- 
environmental ability to monitor one‟s own behavior for the purpose of ingratiation and 
integration were both selective pressures that favored the growth of the human brain and, thus, 
intelligence (Boyd and Silk 2009, 203). Biologist Paul R. Ehrlich (2002) deems the evolution of 
“intense consciousness” (more appropriately, I think, “self-awareness”)--or what the existential 
phenomenologist Martin Heidegger called dasien in reference to a constant co-awareness of 
others--was an aid for “maneuvering in a complicated society of other individuals,” as evidenced 
by the fact that “the size of the primate neocortex appears to be correlated with the complexity of 
social structure” (113). Ehrlich speculates that as social group sizes grew past what we see in 
primate grooming networks, the neocortex grew in order to accommodate the information- 
processing capacity necessary for keeping track of the reciprocity record of allies. 
Thus, instead of an orientation toward self-defense and bonobo- and chimp-like conflict 
interference, the capacity to monitor closely for the subtle cues of cooperation and manipulation, 
and of like and dislike, geared individuals toward self-esteem, what psychologist Mark Leary in 
2004 called an internal gauge or “„sociometer‟ that continuously measures [one‟s] value as a 
relationship partner” so as to maintain rapport with helpful group members (Haidt 2012, 90). The 
sociometer could, then, detect--on others‟ faces and in their body language (and later through the 
grapevine)--whether one had a good reputation that could preempt conflicts and ensure stable 
alliances. In general, that reputation was a measure of one‟s reciprocity, a matter to be addressed 
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later, in the context of altruism. But for now, suffice it to say that while one‟s ability to 
manipulate others out of the kindness of their tasty strawberries came to be one aspect of the 
human social milieu, in addition to the older strategy of brute bullying, so did the motivation to 
provision them voluntarily as a signal of confederation; meanwhile, as groups began to cohere, 
Hobbes‟s war of all against all metamorphosed into a struggle encompassing us versus them, a 
phenomenon that, through the capacity of shared intentionality, led to ethnocentrism in modern 
humans. 
Unfortunately, intense consciousness or self-awareness enables not only cooperation but 
manipulation, or what Frans de Waal diagnosed in chimps in 1982 as "Machiavellian 
intelligence...a component of human intelligence thought to be rooted in the selective value of 
using cunning, cooperation, and deceit” to artfully guide other members of a social group into 
acting against their own self-interest (Ehrlich 2002, 207). Another theory of hominin 
encephalization suggests that the large and proficient “social brain...evolved via intense social 
competition in which social competitors developed increasingly sophisticated „Machiavellian‟ 
strategies as a means to achieve higher social and reproductive success” (Gavrilets and Vose 
2006, 16823). While there is no doubt that humans (like Machiavelli!) possess Machiavellian 
intelligence, its association with early brain-size growth assumes, first and foremost, male-male 
competition for mates as an organizational framework, which I have already asserted was on a 
downward trend due to the selective benefits of cooperation. Furthermore, self-awareness and 
intelligence imply that we are just as likely to perform magnanimous team-building acts that 
elicit the brain‟s disbursement of chemical rewards for bonding in the same way that we 
recreationally manipulate drugs and sex for similar physiological pleasures. Ethologists can attest 
that solidarity is important many primate species. 
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After fights, “chimpanzees sometimes kiss their former opponents, female baboons grunt 
quietly to their former victims, and golden monkeys may embrace or groom their former 
adversaries” (Boyd and Silk 2009, 187), while notoriously promiscuous bonobos “rub genitals 
after disputes,” demonstrating an evolved need deep in our shared heritage “to preserve 
relationships that are valuable to the participants, protecting them from the corrosive effects of 
aggression” (Ehrlich 2002, 207). Among hominins, once there was an absence of an alpha male 
to establish everyone‟s place, and once general male-male competition was reduced and social 
life revolved around offspring-provisioning (as it also does in a few other primate species), 
extended alliances became essential in both defense and reproduction, the keystones of genetic 
success in social species. But because of the brain‟s primitivity during the evolution of such a 
paradigm, early hominin cooperation cannot yet have amounted to the birth of pure altruism. As 
discussed below, however, the human neurochemical profile is uniquely designed to reward 
reciprocity over Machiavellian intelligence, making the survival strategies coequal. 
THE BIOLOGY OF SOCIAL SENSITIVITY 
 
Reviewing the behavioral and emotional faculties involved in the functioning of the 
striatum (a cluster of neurons in the basal ganglia), Raghanti et al. (2018) compare the 
neurochemical profiles in that region of humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, baboons, macaques, and 
capuchins. They conclude that the human striatal neurochemical profile is uniquely developed 
for cooperative behavior--what Haidt calls the hive mentality (2012, 258)--due to higher levels of 
serotonin and a high ratio of dopamine to acetylcholine relative to the other primates studied. 
The authors label this complex of features the “dopamine-dominated striatum” (1111), a further 
synthesis of what physiologist Ruud van den Bos (2015), one of the earliest scientists to 
understand the social significance of the striatum, called in humans the “ventral striatum-tilted 
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personality.” Dopamine reinforces neural connections made during social bonding and appears in 
increased levels in pair-bonded (or “monogamous”) species (1110); serotonin is often higher in 
social animals because it promotes the capacity to coexist in a proximity that would spark 
aggression among non-kin; and while acetylcholine supports learning and memory, and is thus 
high in apes, it is relatively lower in humans, the authors state, because it also contributes to 
reduced aggression while promoting social responsiveness, which is associated with conformity 
and attention to external/social cues (1111). No doubt mirror neurons are at the bottom of such 
an ability to pay attention and pick up on others‟ dispositions, but it is the neurotransmitters that 
define the emotionally motivated dimension of a prosocial behavioral repertoire inspired by such 
sophisticated intersubjectivity. 
Statistically, the Raghanti team found that humans have more activity in the ventral 
striatum than any of the other primates studied based on the neurochemical distribution in that 
region. The ventral (lower) striatum is part of the mesolimbic dopamine pathway, a “system that 
regulates emotions [and] is more sensitive to social and environmental cues. It regulates 
externally guided conduct and facilitates behavioral flexibility” (2018, 1109). This part of the 
striatum is directly linked to the area where dopamine is produced and is involved in prosocial 
behavior, unconditional trust, and motivation and reward, and is also rich in oxytocin receptors, 
behaviorally associated with social approach, attachment, maternal care, and cooperation (Kim et 
al. 2009, 2074). 
Conversely, the dorsal (upper) striatum “is involved in internally driven, goal-directed 
behaviors” (Raghanti et al. 2018, 1108) and is more dominant in all the other primates studied. 
But these species are not emotionally or socially monolithic; individuals within each species 
exhibit a continuum of dopamine, acetylcholine, and serotonin profiles, indicating what we 
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already know: that not every individual in a species has the same personality. The authors found 
that individuals with high activity in the dorsal area were “internally driven and exhibited a high 
level of autonomy,” indicating superficial or contextual interaction with the social environment 
and a tendency toward aggression and dominant behavior (2018, 1109). Alternatively, 
individuals that exhibit higher activity in the ventral area tend to be “less aggressive,” 
“subordinate in social interactions,” and “heavily influenced by the actions of others.” Similarly, 
a review by Wacker and Smillie (2015) concludes that what was, early in the science, a 
hypothesized “link between extraversion and individual differences in brain dopamine” is firmly 
established (232). 
The work of Van den Bos affirms that differences between aggression/passivity and 
inward/outward drive constitute the fundamental physiological basis of personality/style in the 
animal world (2015, 15). Such variation, then, explains the phenomenon of alpha-types and 
submissive-types in social species organized into dominance hierarchies, including chimps, 
baboons, macaques, lions, and hyenas. And anyone who has owned two or more pets can 
certainly attest to the fascinating variety of personality even among nonhumans! But this data 
also provides a clue on the trail of kindness; it suggests that outwardly-oriented and/or less 
aggressive individuals (who must also present a number of other characteristics, including, 
according to social psychologists, self-esteem and a secure attachment style) might possess a 
ventral striatum particularly oriented toward positive social interactions. 
In the same way that Iacoboni‟s study of mirror neurons is lacking a synthesis with 
findings in neurochemistry that demonstrate the physiology of empathic emotions, the Raghanti 
study leaps over the faculty of intersubjectivity that enables instinctual recursivity in the first 
place. Autism is a disorder that provides an example of the connection between these two 
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systems. Through testing in the 1990‟s, psychologists came to see autism as a disorder entailing 
a deficiency in the imitation capacity leading to a faulty intersubjectivity mechanism. Critical of 
the “theory of mind” module that states recursivity is a reasoned cognitive thought process 
leading to an intersubjective awareness, some scholars began to argue that the primary deficit in 
autism was emotional (Iacoboni 2009, 170). 
Simultaneous studies at the University of Aberdeen and UC-San Diego found that “an 
early developmental failure of the mirror neuron system” with a cascading effect on other 
developmental impairments was the cause of autism (173). Neuhaus, Beauchaine, and Bernier 
(2010) point out that dopamine‟s reward system for promoting social affiliation begins with an 
instinctual “appetite” for the chemical--an appetite that is awakened by nearby “social stimuli 
such as facial expressions, vocalizations, and gestures” that then “encourage behavioral 
approach” (738). The implication is thus that the inability to inwardly mirror others‟ facial 
expressions and body language cuts off the social reward system before it even begins because 
social stimuli cannot stimulate dopamine‟s initial appetitive phase. The result is a behavioral 
indifference toward an ongoing state of physiological disconnection. 
Not to jar the reader out of this haze of technical biological jargon, but I find it necessary 
as well as intriguing to point out that, in light of the neo-functionalist approach I mentioned at 
the beginning, the behavioral dynamic described so far matches a bridging of Weberian and 
Durkheimian sociology in which, although human motives are irrational/emotional in the pursuit 
of values, they are quantifiable in the sense that social life depends upon the regularity of 
meaning, which is not only a historical process but the collective representation of an established 
order (and often an established hierarchy). The largest difference between this sociological 
sentiment and that articulated in the preceding biological discussion is that one might add 
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“...collective representation of an evolutionarily established order.” But in light of the continuum 
expressed by individual variations in the striatum‟s neurochemical profiles, it is appropriate to 
also include the critiques of functionalism by practice theorists like Giddens and Bourdieu, who 
are respectively attentive to the “reflexive monitoring” (1979) and “questions of style” (1977) 
present within collectivities that represent agents of structural change. 
These two phrases reflect, for me, theories that unknowingly describe the observable 
effects of mirror neurons and striatum profiles. Take, for instance, antisocial personality disorder 
(once called sociopathy), defined in the American Psychiatric Association‟s current diagnostic 
manual as “a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others,” including 
failure to conform to social norms, deceitfulness, impulsivity, irritability, aggressiveness, 
irresponsibility, and lack of remorse. While some research (e.g. Shirtcliff et al. 2009) implicates 
the insular cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, along with the mirror neuron system, in 
callousness and unemotional (CU) traits and empathy deficits, other studies, such as that by 
Glenn and Yang (2012) or Carré et al. (2013), find dysfunction or abnormality in the ventral 
striatum and the amygdala to be related to antisocial personality disorders. 
No doubt all these studies report accurate data, given the brain‟s interconnective 
complexity, but I would draw a parallel between the latter two examples and what van den Bos 
(2015) characterizes as a pathology at the extreme end of the dorsal-dominated-striatum 
personality, indicating social obliviousness, a high level of autonomy due to inwardly-oriented 
goal-seeking, aggression, non-conformance, and a superficial relationship with the social 
environment. Most people, obviously, are not sociopaths--some inwardly-directed individuals 
may simply fall under the rubric of the old pop psychology Type A personality: driven, 
competitive, irritable, aggressive. One is also reminded of the aggrandizer type known to 
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archaeological theory, usually a male who managed to direct resources and alliances toward the 
maintenance of his high status and reputation, all the while manipulating while obscuring the 
Marxian relations of production (e.g. Hayden 1994). 
While the Type A person may be bereft of Giddens‟s “reflexive monitoring” skills, the 
aggrandizer-chief apparently had a mastery of Bourdieu‟s “questions of style,” enabling him not 
only to the play the game of social praxis but to become a cultural innovator. Aggrandizers today 
might be successful CEO‟s, national politicians, megachurch televangelists, organized crime 
bosses, or the Kardashians. Absent any accumulative or exploitative behaviors, however, they 
may simply be charismatic leaders, movers and shakers, like a Malcolm X or a Susan B. 
Anthony, who are able to mobilize immense intellectual and human resources. 
At the other end of van den Bos‟s behavioral continuum are externally-directed 
individuals, the “low-ranking/subordinate animals” who are acutely attuned to their 
environments (2015, 9) and whose polar orientation toward ventral rather than dorsal striatal 
activity is displayed in behavior that tends toward allocentrism, passivity, or reactivity, resulting 
in short shrift in the pecking order. The hormone and neurochemical oxytocin also has a place in 
external orientation or allocentric, as opposed to egocentric, behavior. Oxytocin, as noted above, 
rewards mother-infant bonding through childbirth and breastfeeding, while also reinforcing 
interactions involving “trust, empathy, eye contact, face memory, and generosity” (Insel 2010, 
774). 
Several studies with regard to genetic variation on the oxytocin receptor gene (an allele 
called “rs53576,” which involves a guanine to adenine substitution), show that this subtle change 
can result in “a range of favorable attributes, such as high levels of trust, self-esteem, empathy, 
maternal sensitivity, and may be more attuned to social cues” (McQuaid et al. 2015, 1153). 
30  
Unfortunately, there is a downside of extremity in striatal activity and the genetic oxytocin 
variant. As to the former, van Bos states that “in both tails of the distribution, stronger 
differences emerge, with potential social pathology, because of a loss of flexibility in shifting 
between the activity of the dorsal and the ventral striatum” (2015, 11). Complete dominance of 
either the ventral or dorsal striatum can result in violent behavior--impulsive violence on the one 
hand and planned violence on the other. 
Oakley, Knafo, and McGrath (2012), in hesitantly exploring the dark side of altruism, 
describe its pathological form as “any behavior or personal tendency in which either the stated 
aim or the implied motivation is to promote the welfare of another. But, instead of overall 
beneficial outcomes, the „altruism‟ instead has irrational (from the point of view of an outside 
observer) and substantial negative consequences to the other or even to the self” (3). They label a 
wide array of psychologically problematic behaviors as pathological altruism, from 
codependency, empathy-based guilt, and pet hoarding to suicide martyrdom, in which “the 
altruistic intention [is] to help companions or one‟s own in-group” (3). They also implicate 
Williams syndrome, a developmental disorder caused by a number of gene deletions from 
chromosome 7. Along with other unrelated physical symptoms, people with Williams syndrome 
exhibit “a general presentation of extreme happiness,” are “unusually sociable, friendly and 
empathic,” and have “an excessive interest in others and a distinct lack of inhibition with regard 
to approaching others in social contexts” (Little et al. 2013, 959). 
These cases represent extremes, but they also provide physiological evidence for the non- 
selfish end of a continuum of personality variation that undermines the unilateral implications of 
the theory of the selfish gene. In the case of the evolution of altruism, natural selection has, in 
some cases, demonstrate that even when individuals within the same species pursue, dependent 
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upon hereditary genetic design, either helping or nonhelping survival strategies, the fitness 
results are the same, showing both behaviors to be equal and “optimal solutions to ecological 
problems” (Cornwallis 2018, 1686). As such, human behaviors that promote a feeling of 
community, an emotional sense of goodwill, and a motivation toward generosity, will have been 
favorably selected right alongside those that selfishly promote the survival machine‟s genes in a 
more direct manner. While the latter template may be more common, it cannot have been more 
successful over the eons or altruism could not have evolved in humans. 
Because non-reciprocal altruism and Machiavellian intelligence represent social 
extremes, most people probably statistically plot on the middle of this continuum (Pinker 2003, 
256-259). On average, as shown in the Raghanti study, our species has a uniquely formatted 
striatum that guides us into amenability, rather than either unmeasured generosity or outright 
selfishness, by the social neurotransmitters in the ventral side, so most of us should be fairly 
docile, generally law-abiding, going along to get along, if not downright conformists. Maybe we 
dream about giving it all away, about fighting or cheating the system, maybe we even buy local 
and go vegan and advocate socialism. But we go to work, we get paid, and we pay rent. And how 
many of us in heterosexual relationships deliberately choose not to have children or to adopt? 
Why do we tend to behave, structurally-speaking, like everybody else? And why is kindness so 
often limited only to those we know? 
For anthropologists invested in social constructionism, conformity and ethnocentrism are 
indicative of the overwhelming primacy of “nurture” or enculturation in human behavior, as 
suggested in Berger and Luckmann‟s ([1966] 1991) The Social Construction of Reality, which 
asserts, in-line with Tooby and Cosmides‟ SSSM, that most of our beliefs and behaviors are 
inculcated during childhood through example and instruction. With regard to the vagaries of 
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cultural diversity, this is undeniable, but there is a grave oversight in the conflation of culture 
with widespread human patterns of emotion and behavior, which are, because of their ubiquitous 
frequency over human time and global space, going to be dictated by evolutionary tendencies. 
For instance: cultural attitudes toward homosexuality vary wildly from country to country; some 
nations have passed laws against it that may entail imprisonment or execution, while some have 
legalized gay marriage. A social constructionist might insist that such divergent beliefs are 
illustrative of the complete absence of universal human behaviors and thus represent the failure 
of evolutionary theory to explain culture. 
The problem with this stance is that it simplistically ignores the sheer instinctual pull of 
adherence to culturally-salient tenets that evolved as a result of selection for a socially-oriented 
psychological reward system as described in this paper. Nor can a theory of the primacy of social 
construction explain deviance from encultured values and practices in the same way that 
individual physio-neurological antisocial or internally-directed striatum profiles can, a problem 
with which cultural anthropologists have struggled ever since the appearance of the contrary 
Omaha Indian named Two Crows in Edward Sapir‟s 1938 critique of the culture-personality 
theory. Anthropologists have, unfortunately, taken Two Crows‟ deviance and run with it: in 
postmodernist theory, everyone is an individual agent of change. Conversely, I would suggest 
that Durkheim was more right about the authority of society over the individual than Boas or any 
anthropologist since him because most of us are wired through evolution to survive through the 
social. 
ETHNOCENTRISM AND CONFORMITY AS REALITIES OF ALTRUISM 
 
In the nature vs. nurture debate, Epley and Gilovich (1999) assert the “nonconscious,” 
instinctual influence of social cognition on human behavior. Through the natural selection 
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process, modern humans seem to possess an innate need to belong to groups (Baumeister and 
Leary 1995) as well as an innate aversion to being excluded by them (Holt-Lunstad et al. 2010) 
that, as reflected in the workings of the mesolimbic dopamine system, is deeply tied to emotion 
centers in the brain. Indeed, mirror neurons illustrate that, in the social milieu, perception, 
emotion, and cognition are coordinated and nearly simultaneous (Iacoboni 2009, 12-13; Haidt 
2012, 52). Weber argued over a century ago that there is not much in human cognition that is 
absent of emotional motive. He was inadvertently making a neurological observation. 
Psychologists knew before the discovery of mirror neurons that complex social 
interactions have a direct channel to the brain‟s primitive infrastructure. In the classic “line- 
length experiment,” in which male participants were asked to make an easy judgment as to which 
line out of three was the longest, Asch (1956) showed that 75% were likely to, at least once, 
report the obviously incorrect answer in order to conform to the response by confederates who 
had been instructed by the researchers to unanimously answer incorrectly. (A confederate is 
someone who is part of the research and therefore knows what participants are being tested for.) 
Sherif and Sherif (1969) confirmed these results with a wider variety of both objective and 
subjective judgments. 
More disturbingly, the classic but controversial 1963 study on obedience to authority by 
Milgram (2009 [1974]) showed that extreme punishment--in the form of electric shocks that 
subjects believed they were administering--may be meted out to peers based on no other logic 
than the encouragement of a cultural authority--a scientist in a lab coat, or, as Milgram imagined 
in his interpretation, a military captain in a uniform. Sixty-five percent of participants worked 
their way up to the maximum 450 volts as punishment for incorrect answers while believing that 
34  
the confederate in the next room was calling out in pain, while a full 92% obeyed when their 
only job was to instruct someone else to administer the shock. 
While, as a matter of statistical average, most of us are designed to promote social accord 
and seek out social approval, we are also, in general, designed by natural selection to avoid 
interactions that might lead to social unrest. Milgram was mystified by his subjects‟ inability to 
defy the scientist; even as they verbally vowed to discontinue the shocks and displayed visible 
distress, they continued to shock the confederates. He could only conclude that it was a problem 
of protocol: waxing anthropological, he stated: “Social occasions, the very elements out of which 
society is built, are held together...by the operation of a certain situational etiquette, whereby 
each person respects the definition of the situation presented by another and in this way avoids 
conflict, embarrassment, and awkward disruption of social exchange” (2009, 152). In short, he 
was describing the primacy of a social structure, which was heightened by the immediacy of a 
power disparity between paid subject and scientific expert. He concluded, in affirming the 
writing of Hannah Arendt on the banality of evil, “[i]t is the extreme willingness of adults to go 
to almost any lengths on the command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding of the 
study and the fact most urgently demanding explanation” (5). One might argue that the Cold War 
era was a strange time of extremist conformity, but incidents like Abu Ghraib suggest otherwise. 
Neuroscience has helped to find extra-cultural explanations of the Durkheimian primacy 
of structure. MacDonald and Leary (2005) state that “social and physical pain overlap in the 
attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions of humans” because they “operate via shared mechanisms. 
Specifically, both types of pain have been shown to involve the anterior cingulate cortex and 
periaqueductal gray brain structures and the opioid and oxytocin neuroendocrine systems” (203, 
emphasis mine). Nonconformance to group perceptions and decisions has been found to activate 
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the rostral cingulate zone and the ventral striatum (Klucharev et al. 2009), regions associated 
with the chemical punishment of social inappropriateness, and the amygdala (Berns et al. 2005), 
the area associated with remembering the emotional effects of the automatic fight-or-flight fear 
response. Interestingly, these experiments in conformity often involve little more than deviation 
from group opinions on matters like line lengths, mentioned above, or the properties of a 3-D 
shape. It stands to reason that if such simple disagreements cause distress to people in the 
vacuum of the lab, interpersonal cultural conflicts must cause that much more anxiety, while 
instances of cultural cohesion should occasionally result, as Durkheim predicted, in the euphoria 
of collective effervescence. 
Indeed, social psychologists consider positive social interactions like bonding and 
conformance to have an “anxiety-buffering” function which facilitates activation of the 
parasympathetic nervous system, providing a person with continual access to a sense of calm 
(Martens, Greenberg, and Allen 2008). According to Kruglanski‟s (1989) theory of lay 
epistemology, the psychological need for the anxiety reduction and existential meaning inherent 
in social cognition means that adherence to socially-accepted beliefs and behaviors tends to 
trump devotion to logic and rationality because cultural conformity offers a biased view of 
reality that validates the group-identified self. In an essay on the sociobiology of ethnocentrism, 
Flohr (1986) suggested that social cognition (unlike our technological prowess) developed as a 
response to the practical problems of daily group living and not as an optimal solution to finding 
truth (195), while Vine (1986) stated that psycho-social orientations like self-deception, 
cognitive dissonance, and group narcissism have adaptive values for the individual and the social 
group, including the ability to cement trust (when it is not truly earned) and physical or 
ideological defense of the social unit. 
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The pressure to maintain the structural stability of a culture‟s social solutions to daily 
living is also strong: the conservative tendency to defend tradition (often to the point of warfare) 
is indicative of the extent to which day-to-day coping is tied up in the maintenance of the cultural 
anxiety buffer. The typical neophobic attitude most people seem to effect toward cultural change 
has been theorized to be based on the individual‟s idiosyncratic sensitivity in the fear structure of 
the amygdala (Blackford et al. 2009). Such emotions are, in many different animals, based on 
“genetically determined, naturally occurring individual differences” in dopamine receptors in the 
striatum (Siemiątkowski et al. 2004), but in humans, the implication is that a willingness to 
adhere to a social status quo imparts neurological benefits while an upsetting of established 
norms, even if voluntarily done, provokes stress and fear. If group cohesion through conformity 
elicits chemical rewards and anomie provokes an autonomic fear response in the same way that a 
vicious dog does, then I would suggest that kindness towards others represents a cohesion 
strategy on steroids that follows the kind of psychosomatic carrot on a stick that human 
sociobiology was designed to seek. 
Williams and Zadro (2001) propose that painful reactions to communal discord represent 
adaptations to the potentially deadly effects of ostracism among our ancestors as verified in non- 
human primate studies (e.g. Kling et al. 1970; Silk et al. 2003). According to Williams‟ 1997 
need-threat theory, ostracism poses a threat to four basic social motivations: the need to belong, 
the need for control, the need for self-esteem, and the need for a meaningful existence (Williams 
and Zadro 2001, 39). His and Zadro‟s studies of ostracism span multiple types of exclusion and 
rejection, from social to physical to online, and include multiple methodologies, from controlled 
lab experiments involving ball games or computers to real-life simulations, written accounts, and 
structured interviews. Their results have shown cross-cultural correspondence: respondents 
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report loss of self-worth, a sense of purposelessness, suicidal thoughts, signs of trauma (from 
pauses in phone conversations to fear of silence at night), and health issues such as eating 
disorders, migraines, heart palpitations, fatigue, and high blood pressure (42). 
On the bright side, though--as a response to the hazards of ostracism--evolution has 
encouraged hyper-cooperative behavior. Mood enhancement and a boost to self-esteem have 
been shown to be the result of helping and compassionate prosocial behavior (Sprecher and Fehr 
2006). In a 25 year study of the link between prosocial behavior and empathy, beginning with 
children who were four to five years old, “other-oriented” behavior such as helping, sharing, and 
donating manifested well beyond mere compliance, tended to be costly, and persisted into 
adulthood as part of individuals‟ personalities (Eisenberg 2007, 74-75). And, although our 
nervous system seems to automatically recoil at the idea of evolutionarily costly altruism toward 
non-kin, oxytocin, along with its kindness-rewarding effects, has the prodigious capacity to 
override the selfish gene‟s imperative, not only increasing the release of dopamine along the 
mesolimbic pathway but dampening any arousal in the amygdala in order to reduce the anxiety 
that otherwise might be aroused by non-reciprocal altruism (Zak et al. 2007, 1128). Mirror 
neurons, oxytocin, and dopamine, therefore, provide a neo-functionalist response to overly 
conservative evolutionary theories of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness, which cannot 
account for random acts of kindness or extra-cultural charity. 
As with Iacoboni, Haidt‟s study of the evolution of morality largely overlooks dopamine, 
and he instead chooses mirror neurons and oxytocin as the vectors signifying “the biology of the 
hive switch” (2012, 266) that evolved, he says, in a synthesis of Darwin and Durkheim, to 
“create cohesive groups that can function like [individual] organisms” (300). Pointing to a Dutch 
study in which men played economic games alone in cubicles, linked via computers into small 
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teams, Haidt states that the results show the way in which oxytocin--administered along with a 
placebo as a nasal spray--causes less selfish decisions (271). But, in a prisoner‟s dilemma game, 
it also caused a greater level of retaliation against members of the outgroup, suggesting the 
existence of a dark side to solidarity that often manifests in culture traits that revolve around 
xenophobic traditions. It would seem that it is only the rare psychological profile that can 
surmount evolution‟s average design, even in a social species. So, do all these findings prove that 
even the most positive emotions that promote extra-familial cooperation evolved for the function 
of self-interest? 
Iacoboni admits that there is no one-to-one relationship between mirror neurons and 
empathy; mirror neurons are indicative only of the extreme utility of the ability to imitate and 
can encode for and encourage the imitation of violence and cruelty as well (Iacoboni 2009, 268). 
The cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker (2003) speculates that the evolutionary solution to 
ruthless selfishness in humans may be “a moral sense” that “evolved in our species rather than 
having to be deduced from scratch by each of us” after every new fight (2003, 187). But Pinker 
also bemoans the human “tendency to confuse morality with conformity, rank, cleanliness, and 
beauty” (294), and Haidt suggests that while a “moral matrix provides a complete, unified, and 
emotionally compelling worldview,” people will attain to moralities that conflict, causing 
interpersonal and cultural strife and sometimes violence (2012, 125). This suggests--to state the 
obvious--that moral ideologies are not universal and are therefore a function only of the 
proximal, local need to maintain the evolutionary mandates of cooperation, fairness, and 
reciprocity, an ecology of ethical conduct that extends only as far as its adherents and their 
needs. This would make sense, as humans did not behaviorally evolve in groups as numerous as 
exist today in nations or in world religions. 
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Indeed, because the intense bonds of the (small) social group were so important in our 
most recent eons of evolution, according to Haidt, fMRI scanning shows that biased adherence to 
a given ideology (say, a political party or a religion) provides such a reliably patterned secretion 
of dopamine in the ventral striatum that partisanship and zealotry may qualify as addictive (2012, 
102)! Based on the demographics of hunter-gatherer groups, Ehrlich suggests that ancient 
hominin populations were probably composed of 25 to 50 individuals (not unlike modern chimp 
troops), in the Paleolithic growing to 100-200 individuals who were partially part of larger tribal 
entities as cooperation and technology stabilized resource exploitation (2002, 173). As such, 
Ehrlich concludes that these statistics represent “the most important lesson to learn from our long 
existence as hunter-gatherers”: that, in terms of any “genetic predisposition,” humans “must still 
be basically a small-group animal, accustomed to living in units of at most hundreds or 
thousands, not millions or billions, of individuals” (173-174). 
When the term “human nature” was still acceptable in the field of anthropology, Jane B. 
Lancaster (1975) wrote: “Over 99 percent of human history was spent as „man the hunter- 
gatherer‟, and what we think of as „human nature‟ evolved to cope with social situations and 
problems arising from life in small groups with face-to-face contact. Small wonder that many 
human beings find it hard to feel brotherhood with the millions of strangers who now share their 
world” (5). Social psychologists tend to concur with this disheartening conceptualization (Haidt 
2012, 125; Pinker 2003, 187; Karau and Williams 1993). In light of the possible natural selection 
of ethnocentrism, the evolutionary possibilities of indiscriminate kindness appear reduced. But, 
paradoxically, the allocentric dynamic of ethnocentrism may be where the possibilities of 
kindness emerge. 
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There seems to have been, as has been explained in the foregoing, a special vector in 
humanity‟s evolution of cooperation that imparts the capacity to exceed the kind of reciprocal 
non-kin altruism described by Trivers. Haidt describes it as “the ability (under special 
conditions) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in 
something larger than ourselves” (2012, 258). Typical of iterations of altruism, Haidt is careful 
in making two disclaimers of feasibility in the ability to transcend the selfish gene dynamic. But 
I would amend this. Based on the data we have established on oxytocin and the dopamine- 
dominated striatum, and in consideration of the physiologically extreme forms implicating 
allocentrism, I would suggest that some people are indeed endowed with the capacity to 
transcend self-interest and lose themselves not only in the group but in a larger conception of 
humanity as a global tribe. These individuals, therefore, represent the strawberry factor in the 
human condition. 
BEYOND ALTRUISM AND HOMO ECONOMICUS: KINDNESS AS FITNESS 
 
Biological accounts of altruism tend toward a conception of humanity that has been 
described in economic theory as Homo economicus, a species that will always act rationally as 
motivated by individual self-interest in accordance with the selfish gene. So, although, as we 
have seen, humans evolved to be quite emotionally attuned to others, this attunement was 
directed generally toward 1) parties‟ mutual interests and 2) an individual‟s integration into the 
social group. Altruism is thus not, on its surface, an exception to the rule of the selfish gene-- 
except, perhaps, in a species that has the ability to manipulate its own neurochemical rationing in 
the same way that recreational sex and drug-use capitalize on nature‟s incentives. 
We‟ve already seen how cooperation evolved both physiologically and behaviorally, and 
cultures seem to almost universally include institutions of fairness and accountability (which 
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tend to be more easily enforceable with smaller group sizes where proximity encourages 
fidelity). In accordance with Trivers‟ theory of reciprocal altruism, Haidt states that moral 
ideologies centered on fairness “evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of reaping the 
rewards of cooperation without getting exploited” (2012, 178). Stressing the utility to the 
ingroup of punishment of free-riders and ostracism of deviants, he expanded the concept to 
include the way in which norms and laws enforce (sometimes irrational but always ethnocentric) 
paradigms of proportionality and deservingness. Meanwhile, cultural anthropologists have, since 
the work of Marcel Mauss ([1950] 2000), suggested that a gift (from food sharing in hunter- 
gatherer groups to wedding presents in the US) is never free because it is usually given with the 
expectation of reciprocity. But upon a closer look we find that the selfish gene, in humans, is 
complicated by the exceptional proclivities of the dopamine-dominated striatum. Before 
discussion of the mitigation of neurochemistry in the selfish gene paradigm, let‟s take a brief 
look at the mechanics of altruism. 
In primates, examples of altruism often reflect the Homo economicus model, only 
occurring when the situation is likely to resolve as a win-win one--an example would be when 
two subordinate males band together to challenge one alpha male. But biological altruism must 
specifically involve the sacrifice of genetic fitness, so this example is simply mutual cooperation. 
A better example is alarm calling in some monkey species. The conservative argument, labeled 
“kin selection” in a landmark theory by W.D. Hamilton (1964), states that alarm calling cannot 
have evolved unless a particular measure of kinship within a group was met. So, if an altruist- 
gene-bearing monkey gave an alarm call to a group of unrelated monkeys, it sacrificed its own 
individual and genetic fitness while allowing a group made up of potentially all genetic non- 
altruists to survive. This means that the gene or set of genes for alarm calling would have 
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eventually disappeared from the population‟s gene pool. Altruism, therefore, can only evolve if 
some of the group members being saved from the predator are related to the altruist and therefore 
may also possess the alarm-calling gene. Thus saved, they can pass the trait down, their genes 
persisting despite risky behavior. 
Grooming is another altruistic behavior in primates that may correlate with human 
generosity, but again, it is more common among kin and is usually reciprocated, another example 
of mutualism (Boyd and Silk 2009, 186). However, food-sharing among chimps and bonobos has 
been well-documented, and interestingly, the more highly prized the food (meat and rare fruit), 
the more frequently we see sharing (Byrnit et al. 2015, Hockings et al. 2007). Is this still the 
behavior of Homo (or Pan) economicus? I would answer yes and no. On the one hand, kinship, 
extra-kin reciprocity, alliance-building, and annoying harassment by others have been shown to 
be the motives of food sharing in chimps (Silk et al. 2013). On the other hand, Yamamoto (2015) 
reports “non-reciprocal” and “courteous food sharing” by dominant female bonobos with 
subordinate ones who seem merely to be testing their superiors‟ feelings toward them. The 
behavior is not likely to be a function of alliance networking, as dominant females will already 
have firm alliances established based on their hierarchal privilege. 
But at the root of it all seems to be, as you may have guessed by now, a chemical feeling 
of goodwill. Wittig et al. (2014) report, in a study involving urine analysis, that oxytocin levels 
in wild chimpanzees rise during food-sharing behaviors with kin and non-kin alike. Importantly, 
they also note that these high oxytocin levels are greater during this evolutionarily risky behavior 
of food-sharing than they are when engaging in less-costly altruistic behaviors like grooming. 
Scientists have studied the physiology of altruistic emotions in the lab (Kim et al. 2009; Sprecher 
and Fehr 2006), sometimes through the administration of oxytocin (De Dreu et al. 2010; Zak et 
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al. 2007). Social psychologists have also promoted the existence of an imitative, environmental 
aspect in which amenability and generosity depend upon the milieu in the family home; yet, 
identical, fraternal, and virtual twins studies indicate the heritability of many testable social traits 
(Greenberg et al. 2015, 476; Pinker 2003, 47), a trend in which prosocial behavior and social 
accountability rank the highest (Ebstein et al. 2000)--traits we have addressed under the umbrella 
of neurochemicals and the striatum. Herein lies the source of a physiological compulsion behind 
a conception of human nature that opposes the theory of Homo economicus. 
The biology of kindness thus illustrates how non-reciprocal altruism, as a social 
manifestation of adaptive fitness, represents a way to access, on the one hand, the evolved 
behavioral inclination to ward off ostracism and, on the other hand, the healthy alliances that 
satisfy an instinctive psychological appetite for chemical rewards. If the key to the promotion of 
the selfish gene in human and all other social species is social security (so to speak), then 
kindness would be as effective and fruitful a strategy, and perhaps more so emotionally, as 
forceful alliance through dominance or false federation through lies and manipulation. What I am 
arguing, then, is that kindness satisfies the sociobiological imperatives of human evolution by 
achieving psychological rewards and serving to cement evolutionarily strategic alliances. But it 
does so in an ethically accountable manner that, as an extremely beneficial byproduct, affords 
benefits to others that do not involve a primitive coefficient of relatedness. In this way, 
interpersonal and ideological kindness is a manifestation of an anthropologically valuable but 
rare iteration of the externally-guided or allocentric dopamine-dominated striatum. 
Even though, therefore, non-reciprocal altruism falls well within the bounds of what we 
assume about developments in late-Pleistocene human behavior, it does not paint a picture that 
biologists outside of primatology would be familiar with. Not only have acts of anonymous 
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international charity confounded scholars of the life sciences, but the idea of a person jumping in 
front of a train to save a stranger or a soldier signing up to die for his country have little to no 
place in altruism theory. Eminent evolutionary biologist George C. Williams, in 1966, insisted 
that “unmeasured generosity” could not evolve unless a species were “genetically fixed and 
hermetically sealed” because selfish infiltrators would take over and “reap the advantages of 
others‟ sacrifices without making their own” (qtd in Pinker 2003, 258). Perhaps he understood 
humans‟ behavioral flexibility, but he did not know about the pull placed on it by, in the right 
psychological profile, dopamine and oxytocin. Nor did he consider the extent to which, as 
discussed above, the traumatic physiological effects of ostracism adaptively pulled most people 
toward conformity and some toward forthright kindness as methodologies of ingratiation beyond 
mere food-sharing where food security is not at issue. These strawberry strategies of social 
survival, thus, exist, but they tend to be overlooked due to the overwhelmingly greater effects on 
society of the behavior of those oriented toward the exploitation rather than the maintenance of 
the hive. 
As Haidt points out, it is really the social life of the eusocial insect, more so than the Pan 
genus, that resembles humans‟ unique community-oriented behavior. Like us, hive species build, 
farm, defend, and procreate cooperatively, but they only function successfully when they “find a 
way to suppress free-riding,” (Haidt 2012, 234), an issue for social species that revolves around 
the potential for exploitation. Suppression of free-riding is necessary when evolution does not 
dampen the behavioral effects of the selfish gene in species the way that it did, say, in 
honeybees--all of whom are completely mind-controlled by their queens‟ hormonal and 
neurochemical signals. Accordingly, the evolution of the social emotions and the development of 
culture has had mixed results in the promotion of cohesion because, as explained in the section 
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on ethnocentrism, it still tends only to extend to the level of the hive--how-ever we might choose 
for that to be defined. Thus, a disclaimer about instinctual cooperation is in order. 
Especially in places where people‟s basic needs of survival, safety, or self-determination 
are not met, civil war, state violence, and ethnic conflict are standard. The same goes for areas 
within the developed nations where quality of life is distressed and social and material resources 
are lacking, resulting in crime and poor sociological outcomes. And even in the West‟s 
privileged pockets where crime is low and outcomes are high, contentious ideological strife 
persists beneath the placidity of farmers‟ markets and soccer practices. This is not to mention the 
exceedingly successful persistence of aggressive behavior (from spousal abuse and sexual 
predation to oil warlords and extra-constitutional military droning) or free-riders (from the local 
damages of organized crime to the national despoilment by Russia‟s free-market thieves and 
corporate American tax havens). Yet, particularly among the military, the mafia, and the elite 
world of finance, even if conscientiousness and harmony are absent, the Gestalt of cult-like 
ethnocentrism persists, and solidarity will often have the last word. But what about those 
members of the species who do have a conscience? 
Pinker suggests that the wide range of specifically social emotions, involving outward 
orientation and the reflexive sociometer for constantly gauging one‟s position vis-à-vis others, 
evolved to adjust to the “demands of reciprocal altruism.” He continues, “Sympathy and trust 
prompt people to extend the first favor. Gratitude and loyalty prompt them to repay favors. Guilt 
and shame deter them from hurting or failing to repay others. Anger and contempt prompt them 
to avoid or punish cheaters… This leads to an interest in the reputation of others, transmitted by 
gossip and public approval or condemnation, and a concern with one's own reputation” (2003, 
243). Journalist Matt Ridley vividly explains this aspect of the human condition: “Reciprocity 
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hangs, like a sword of Damocles, over every human head. He's only asking me to his party so I'll 
give his book a good review. They've been to dinner twice and never asked us back once. After 
all I did for him, how could he do that to me? If you do this for me, I promise I'll make it up 
later. What did I do to deserve that? You owe it to me. Obligation; debt; favour; bargain; 
contract; exchange; deal.... Our language and our lives are permeated with ideas of reciprocity” 
(qtd in Pinker 2003, 256). In general, it sounds like what he is focused on is Homo economicus. 
Centuries ago, Hobbes and Locke suggested that the power of a king or a social contract 
could balance the extractive nature of Homo economicus but, as philosopher Giorgio Agamben 
(1998) has illustrated, the democratic state (and, in Gramscian terms, it should be added, the 
state‟s socioeconomically hegemonic actors), tends not to neutralize Homo economicus but, 
rather, to embody it. A large part of the Republican Party‟s political platform is dedicated to the 
public policy that citizens should not rely on taxpayer support for their economic well-being 
because they will tend to take advantage of such largesse and become lazy (Hochschild 2016, 35, 
158; Williamson et al. 2011, 26), a startlingly transparent iteration of the problem of free-riding 
despite its complete innocence of a biological perspective. 
However, as Delery and Block (2006) state: “Welfare bums and welfare queens are by no 
means limited to the public housing projects. They are also to be found in the corporate 
boardrooms of some of the most prestigious business firms in the nation” (337) who cost 
taxpayers billions per year (338) so that corporate welfare represents the robust backbone of the 
Republican political project. As such, the evolutionary principle of reciprocity and cooperation 
can manifest in a myriad of ideologies that buttress the supposed legitimacy of irrational and, in 
this case, misguided doxic traditions. Pinker summarizes this anthropological paradox from a 
materialist perspective: “the design of the moral sense,” developing as it did out of the need to 
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cohere through whatever idiosyncrasies validate the group, “leaves people in all cultures 
vulnerable to confusing defensible moral judgments with irrelevant passions and prejudices” 
(2003, 272). 
The emotional ethos underlying the sort of preoccupation with proportionality in 
reciprocity as described by Ridley, above, and in Republicans‟ passionate disgust over welfare 
queens, could be said to be fairness, but when a concern with fairness is directed inwardly as a 
kind of personal standard of conduct toward others rather than outwardly as a kind of vindictive 
social policing, individual conscientiousness will be the impetus for its upkeep. 
Conscientiousness would seem to be a personality trait that varies widely in populations, 
sometimes depending upon cultural values, and sometimes differing from family to family and 
individual to individual. Philosopher Peter Singer has argued, through a problematically 
exceptionalist Western lens, that “[p]eople have steadily expanded the mental dotted line that 
embraces the entities considered worthy of moral consideration...outward from the family and 
village to the clan, the tribe, the nation, the race, and most recently (in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights) to all of humanity” (qtd in Pinker 2003, 167). Perhaps such a sweeping 
statement is a problem of implicit versus explicit cultural values--a declaration is not a law, after 
all, and besides that, laws get broken. Conversely, I would stipulate that certain people in every 
culture have this emotional capacity to embrace a wide moral circle, and that they tend to 
congregate together, in places where agency allows, in social movements or ideologies that 
enable the satisfaction of intersubjective coalescence around the shared sensibility of kindness 
and compassion without borders. 
In his book on the evolution of morality, Haidt (2012) explores psychology through a 
Durkheimian lens that emphasizes cohesion and accountability in small groups as the key 
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Darwinian advantage that enabled the biological success of the human species, formulating a 
touchstone theory for cross-culturally ubiquitous religious and political behaviors. Embracing 
Durkheimian sociology as a framework that reveals the organizing principles of social patterns 
not only in non-stratified or stateless societies but in the industrialized world as well, Haidt 
argues--correctly, I believe--that Durkheim‟s concept of “mechanical” solidarity, in which 
“normative values are shared and more important than individual ones” (Moore 2012, 46), 
should be interpreted as a basis for the species‟ social life. Haidt argues that in every society 
including Western ones, which tend to be politically and economically organized around 
individuality, most people are born into small, closely-knit social units, like those in which 
humanity involved, that contain “strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit 
[one‟s] autonomy,” and these cultures and subcultures “value self-control over self-expression, 
duty over rights, and loyalty to one‟s groups...” (192)--just like the stratified relations in one of 
Durkheim‟s preindustrial societies. 
Arguing against the prominent rationalist approach to moral psychology of Piaget, 
Kohlberg, and Turiel, who have suggested that morality tends to follow the utilitarian logic of 
Homo economicus in simply prescribing fairness and proscribing harm to others, Haidt shows 
that the river of human psychology runs much deeper and wider than the rationalist paradigm 
(2012, 20). Hitching his wagon to the nativist school of thought in which morality is an evolved 
trait, Haidt‟s “moral foundations theory” states that there are six basic psychological modules for 
morality, developed through natural selection in the physiology of hominin ancestors, that are 
likely to be satisfied by any number of culturally-established institutions in order to promote 
socially acceptable means of solidarity (146-147, 193). While Haidt assigns each module an 
original trigger that must have been in effect, and been powerfully selected for, among the rather 
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limited conditions of the Pliocene, he states that the triggers now will vary but still exhibit a 
connection to an ancient psyche geared toward survival in groups, despite our seemingly modern 
surroundings. 
The virtue of Care, according to Haidt, developed out of the neurobiology of parents‟ 
attachment to their offspring; however--as we have seen--care is an attitude that is chemically 
reinforced through a wide range of social interactions. A mandate for Fairness among peers 
comes from the benefit of reciprocal altruism among non-kin, which proved early on to be a 
successful survival strategy among hominin groups. The pull of Loyalty further enabled 
coalitional competition, enhanced in times of need by the Authority module, which played upon 
the dominance/submission behavior of primate ancestors for efficiency in competition and 
organization. However, the latter is kept in check by the Liberty foundation, which blossomed as 
language and weaponry provided less physically-endowed individuals with a voice in the group 
milieu through means other than the innate pecking order, thus putting a check on extreme greed 
(at least for a long stretch of ancient history). Finally, a Sanctity module, originally for 
delineating contaminants and parasites, served to sacralize parochial standards for solidarity, 
making the survival strategy of cohesion into a divine sort of mandate that, like Fairness, 
punishes transgression, but by cosmic decree instead of peer pressure and emotions like shame 
and guilt. 
While stating that the mechanical force of bonding still determines actual, lived and felt 
(often ethnic, religious, or political) social boundaries, Haidt does not explain why some people 
might tend toward a moral system involving the Care and Fairness foundations (which he assigns 
to liberals in the US) while others find comfort in more-organized and hierarchical Authority, 
Loyalty, or Sanctity structures (conservatives in the US). The idea that several radically different 
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moral modules entailing emotional meaning and checks and balances on free-riding are present 
across human time and space is theoretically indicative of various successful social arrangements 
that evolved simultaneously due to their equal viability, which Haidt associates with their ability 
to promote solidarity over selfishness, which in return promotes the species‟ success. But it is 
within the foundations‟ equal viability that the problem of Haidt‟s subtitle lies, and it also 
represents the research question for his book: why good people are divided by politics and 
religion. “Why is it so hard for us to get along?” he asks in the introduction. 
Contrary to Haidt, I strongly disagree that there is a moral equivalency between the 
proposed six foundations or between the ideologies espoused and behaviors displayed by 
adherents of conservative and liberal politics in the US. However, I do agree with his 
sociological assessment--borrowed from the now-abandoned psychological anthropology of 
Richard Shweder--that many cultures across the world can be divided into a dichotomy between 
sociocentric and individualistic, with really only the mainstream Western cultures in the 
Enlightenment tradition representing the latter. The conservative foundations of Authority, 
Sanctity, and Loyalty, Haidt finds, tend to manifest in both society types, according to his 
research in several cultures of varying techno-economic levels across the globe, while he finds 
that Care and Fairness tend to be sociological luxuries that allow the development of a more 
intimate, personalized ethos that lacks the constraints and obligations of sociocentric cultures 
(2012, 114). While such data conflicts with my assertion of the universal if diffuse existence of a 
kindness ethos between and among all cultures, it may be true that the mechanical force of 
solidarity and the institutions designed to support and enforce it are more constraining in 
traditionalistic cultures--and especially in smaller subcultures--in which the established and strict 
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moral norms that emphasize order and authority over fairness and care are more-easily 
compelled due to cultural authorities‟ looming proximity. 
Still, there is the chance for rebellion--or even for the presence of silent, conscientious 
struggle and dissent against established norms--which Haidt does not address. And here is where, 
I believe, the individual‟s psychological profile, if it exerts a strong enough force on a person‟s 
emotions and behaviors, may override, if only in rare cases, the proximal constraints of whatever 
the chosen moral foundation of the local culture may be. What if I live in a society, for instance, 
in which homosexuality is punishable by imprisonment or exile, but as I grow into an adult, I 
realize that I am gay, that there are others out there who are gay, and that I cannot live the lie that 
my family and my religion require of me in order to remain integrated with my natal culture? Or 
perhaps my life has been spent in a small sociocentric circle of Christian fundamentalists who 
believe that abortion is a sin punishable in hell for eternity, and one day I decide that this idea is 
wrong because I don‟t believe people have souls? What if I am a Scientologist but eventually 
come to question the concept of extraterrestrial predecessors or see that the process of “clearing” 
hurts people? There is a theoretical place where this person will surface in the data on the 
biology of kindness. 
The neurochemical data discussed by Raghanti et al. (2018), which entailed the 
sociobiology of cooperation, demonstrate what psychologists already know quite well to be the 
potential for individual variability in emotional and social personalities. Autism and Williams 
syndrome, as previously discussed, represent examples of neurophysiological disorders that 
demonstrate exceptions to the socially average physiology. But it seems obvious that even those 
without such disorders should be seen as falling along a socio-emotional spectrum ranging from 
the sociopath at one extreme to codependent at the other. In articulating the dichotomous social 
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affectations behaviorally exhibited by individuals guided unevenly by either the ventral or dorsal 
striatum, van den Bos (2015) suggests that the presence of binary profiles in the population 
might have developed out of an “evolutionary advantage” that was “conferred to having 
potentially more personalities,” perhaps “allowing for dynamic adaptation to changes in the 
environment” (15). Pinker, meanwhile, believes that “pure magnanimity can evolve in an 
environment of people seeking to discriminate fair-weather friends from loyal allies... The best 
way to convince a skeptic that you are trustworthy and generous is to be trustworthy and 
generous” (2003, 259). Thus, he sees conscientious altruism, as Boehm did decades earlier, as 
evolving through a process of gradual emotional sophistication designed to benefit the individual 
through group functioning, as in the social evolution of the hive insect species but, of course, 
much more nuanced. 
Experiences in life will influence one‟s personality down to the neuronal and synaptic 
level (Niehoff 1999, 116-117) so that people will fluctuate on the spectrum of affectively- 
motivated altruism as they age, but the overarching moral modules remain, so that only one‟s 
orientation toward them is capable of changing (and this, only to the extent of one‟s abilities and 
proclivities). Based on the data revealed in social psychology and neuroscientific imaging 
experiments, conformity and ethnocentrism seem to represent the most common and direct social 
survival strategies. Given the Durkheimian cohesion they impart, they probably also prove the 
most beneficial for the group and whatever its authorities‟ interests happen to be. Kindness, on 
the other hand, offers a rewarding sense of purpose and gratification to the benefactor, while its 
effects on beneficiaries can range from a single individual to many others. An orientation toward 
conscientiousness and kindness will be located in the person who has been neurochemically and 
experientially prepared for such a talent, and it will be evidenced by his or her behavior toward 
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others and, more broadly, perhaps, in his or her fidelity to corresponding culturally-specific 
institutions upholding the Care and Fairness moral foundations. Pinker ultimately suggests a 
variation on Singer‟s theme of the expanding moral circle, stating, “Once the sympathy knob is 
in place, having evolved to enjoy the benefits of cooperation and exchange, it can be cranked up 
by new kinds of information that other folks are similar to oneself” (2003, 168). 
In many modern nations, moral foundations are worked out societally through the 
institution of politics, but, as is obvious, not everyone in a society is endowed with a voice to 
participate in the formation of political platforms. In struggling nations, oligarchs tend to enforce 
their statuses through the Authority, Loyalty, or Sanctity foundations. In democratic nations, the 
foundations, through religion and politics, compete even as the hegemonic status quo may lie 
stagnant (Gramsci [1971] 2014), but it would seem that the liberal platform of public works, 
human rights, corporate regulation, and diversity and tolerance represents the morality of non- 
reciprocal altruism. As I intimated in the opening, this is not to state that liberals do not behave 
selfishly or greedily in their everyday interactions. But most aspects of the liberal platform 
provide evidence that kindness exists abstractly as one element in an otherwise coercive 
structure, while neuroscience and social psychology reveal the delicate material of kindness. 
CONCLUSION 
 
I am wary about closing out this research with a statement regarding my position on what 
is at stake, politically and otherwise, in the pursuit of knowledge surrounding the biology of 
human behaviors like selfishness and kindness. I took the position in the opening that the 
intellectual reputations of cultural anthropologists are at stake if we continue to deny the 
fundamental aspects of evolution that guide, as we blindly follow, the Gestalt of a social reality 
that reveals temporally and spatially repeating patterns of power and violence. True to my 
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training, however, I am skeptical about suggesting that there are any societal possibilities 
inherent in articulating these truths, even if they were to become part of an established 
pedagogical system imparted to young citizens of the West at an early age as part of a cautionary 
as opposed to an exceptionalist discourse about human nature--an idea whose rise to acceptance 
is still very far in the future. 
As I noted in the opening section with a quote by Pinker, the Western narrative of the 
onward march of progress inherited from the Enlightenment era is a subject of scorn for many 
liberal intellectuals. In this paper, on the other hand, I have mobilized the accusation of dogma 
and superstition against social constructionism, which, as Pinker has shown, also derives from 
the Enlightenment. In postmodernist social theory, there seems to be no safe haven from the 
discourse of positivist-phobia established by Said and Foucault that pours like an acidic rain on 
the construction of knowledge, which continues in full force, budgets straining, mostly Western- 
funded, despite intellectuals‟ acknowledgement of a legacy of power and privilege. Having 
critiqued this paradigm, why do I still express trepidation about suggesting “a way forward” as 
closing arguments in many disciplines are so wont to do? 
It is not because I feel dubious about the validity of the research I have cited. And it is not 
because I question the privileged foundations of that research, done for the most part in the West 
by Westerners (with some exceptions, such as studies from Korea, China, and Japan). I have 
already stated that, regardless of the political economy of its funding, the research that I have 
accessed from the fields of neuroscience and social psychology is geared toward explaining 
some of the problematic behaviors that humans acting in groups exhibit, like ostracism and 
conformity and structurally violent ideologies, which I think actually helps illuminate some of 
the issues that constitute the embattled human condition. I find that a biocultural approach, like 
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that being promoted by Pinker and Haidt, represents participation in an intellectual consensus 
geared toward highlighting humanity's primitive tendencies, which biologists and psychologists 
make no bones about ascribing to the people in the West, but which cultural anthropologists deny 
in any culture--a problem, if we are trying to root out power. So what are the stakes of forcing 
the biology of kindness onto an overlay of cultural theory? 
Because I have a measure of confidence, unlike most of my intellectual peers, that 
positivism and structural violence do not represent an infinite symbiotic monolith, it would seem 
that my disbelief in the secular religion of progress branches from a different root than does 
postmodernist skepticism. In fact, my doubt is rooted in positivism, or rather, in my 
interpretation of the implications of the data articulated above. Mere observation of human 
history alone might tell us that behavioral and cultural manifestations of altruism will be acutely 
circumscribed. Sadly, Dawkins‟ selfish gene theory only confirms the gist of Hobbes‟ concept of 
natural law, which states that the living of one‟s life, which first and foremost entails self- 
preservation, in the social realm, entails conflicts with others‟ definitions of all that self- 
preservation entails: 
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure 
himselfe, so reasonable as...by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he 
can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is 
no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also 
because there be some, that taking pleasure in...acts of conquest, which they 
pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad 
to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, 
they would not be able...by standing only on their defence, to subsist. ([1651] 
2013, Chapter XIII) 
 
Marx‟s theory of the estrangement of labor as a function of avarice exudes a Hobbesian 
aura, although I disagree that the institution of private property is somehow a tragic perversion of 
human nature. Property is a much more ancient social fact than the Industrial Revolution, and I 
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suspect that its manifestation as a frequent cultural phenomenon in the archaeological record of 
the first chiefdoms and civilizations simply coincides with the invention of technologies that 
enabled sedentary accumulation. Nonetheless, Marx‟s diagnosis of the coercive relations of 
production illuminates the precarious nature of the biology of kindness that gives me pause in 
mediating the possibilities of a way forward: “There is a form of inactive, extravagant wealth 
given over wholly to pleasure, the enjoyer of which...knows the slave-labour of others (human 
sweat and blood) as the prey of his cupidity, and therefore knows man himself, and hence also 
his own self, as a sacrificed and empty being” (1978, 100). Is it possible that greed also has a 
biology of its own? I think so, and I think it tends to be more potent a force of nature than the 
physiological mechanisms described above. 
I have come as close as I can to taking a stand against the selfish gene in an empirical 
rather than a philosophical way, so that rather than simply complaining about the lack of 
sociopsychological nuance in the theory, I could illuminate the research that suggests 
alternatives. While other scholars in this tradition, such as Pinker and Haidt, whose work has 
guided this one, tend to reflect on their optimistic hopes for our future in the final chapters of 
their biocultural productions (Pinker sentimentally clings to progress, while Haidt, incredibly, 
advocates the impartial rationality of free markets), I prefer to close with a reminder that, as we 
go about our days struggling to get along, to make a life with a spouse, to put food on the table 
and a roof over our heads for us and our children, to take care of elderly loved ones, to seek out 
trustworthy friends with whom we share interests, to ward off illness through healthy living or 
prayers, to accomplish material or ethical goals, we are behaving in a manner that was 
programmed in us through evolution. Having children, striving for status or self-esteem, hoping 
for good health--these behaviors represent some of the most fundamental aspects of animal life. 
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The urge to procreate is hardcoded into our genes, and few human individuals escape its 
pull; longevity is the surest strategy for accomplishing this genetic imperative; status is central to 
reproductive success in any hierarchically social species; and self-confidence is essential in 
garnering the social alliances necessary for emotional and material wellbeing and thus longevity. 
Until social theory embraces the utter and unfortunately unflattering primitivity of the nature of 
human existence, I will continue to advocate for the addition of a biocultural wing to the 
institution of anthropology while warning that the strawberries of the human condition are 
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